House member Sarifudin Sudding testifying at a hearing for the material review of legislative oversight in the Emergency Law, Thursday (6/25/2026). Photo by MKRI/Ifa.

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JAKARTA (MKRI) — The Constitutional Court held the fourth hearing for the material review of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 23 of 1959 on the Revocation of Law No. 74 of 1957 and the Declaration of a State of Emergency on Thursday, June 25, 2026. Petition No. 151/PUU-XXIV/2026 was filed by Sahlul Lubis, Jumhadi, M. Rio Dozan, Lona Armevilia, Faly Antary Musaad, and Muhamad Fery Agung Gumelar (Petitioners I-VI). In this session, the constitutional justices heard testimonies by the House of Representatives (DPR) and the President/Government.

In response to the petition, represented by advisor for economics and social affairs to the Law Ministry Wisnu Nugroho Dewanto, the Government argued that under Article 12 of the 1945 Constitution, the justification for declaring a state of emergency lies in national security. Accordingly, the time limitations for the implementation of a state of emergency under Article 1 paragraph (2) and Article 2 paragraph (1) of the Law a quo are not rigid and absolute, but rather based on the principle of functional emergency, namely that an emergency status must, by operation of law, terminate immediately once national security conditions have returned to normal.

The Government further explained that a state of emergency constitutes an extraordinary condition whose nature, intensity, and duration cannot be predicted with certainty from the outset. Consequently, the legislatures opted for a flexible regulatory framework so that the State can respond effectively to any threats to the safety of the nation and the State.

“The constitutional implementation of a state of emergency may only occur when circumstances satisfy the requirements established by legislation, and its continuation must always be based on a genuine necessity to address the conditions that gave rise to its declaration,” Wisnu stated.

Based on Existing Legal System

In response to the Petitioners’ argument that “Article 33 of the Law a quo allows the military emergency authority to depart from provisions under various regulations inherited from the Dutch colonial era,” the Government explained that, should a military emergency be declared, the exercise of authority under Article 33 of the Law a quo must still be carried out in accordance with the legal system in force at that time and with due regard to legislation that remains legally binding. Regulations that have been repealed or replaced do not automatically create a legal vacuum or legal uncertainty, because the applicable reference point is the body of law in force at the time such authority is exercised.

“All actions taken pursuant to Article 33 of the Law a quo must remain grounded in the principles of the rule of law, legality, proportionality, and the very objective of an emergency regime itself, namely to protect the safety of the nation, the State, and society,” Wisnu explained. 

Legal Instrument for Extraordinary Circumstances

Presenting the House’s statement, Sarifudin Sudding explained that the enactment of the Law a quo constitutes an implementation of the constitutional mandate under Article 12 of the 1945 Constitution, which authorizes the president to declare a state of emergency and requires that the conditions and legal consequences thereof be regulated by statute.

According to Sarifudin, this framework is intended to equip the State with adequate legal instruments to confront extraordinary situations that may disrupt or threaten national sovereignty, territorial integrity, public safety, or national stability. Therefore, any decision to declare a state of emergency is not a matter of unfettered discretion but rather a constitutional decision grounded in legal requirements, conditions, and consequences that can be evaluated under the applicable legal framework.

“In this regard, the House retains other legal mechanisms through which it may hold the Government accountable. This is intended to ensure that every exercise of authority is carried out in accordance with the law and does not exceed the purposes justified by the Constitution,” Sarifudin stated.

Considerations for Legislative Reform

Sarifudin further explained that the continued validity of a legal norm cannot depend solely upon whether the nomenclature of the institutions or offices mentioned in a statute remains unchanged. The decisive factor is whether the governmental functions regulated by the norm continue to exist and operate within the prevailing legal system. Consequently, changes in institutional structures or names cannot be interpreted as extinguishing powers previously conferred by statute.

“The Law a quo remains necessary as a guideline and as a limitation on the authority of government officials in formulating state policies. Nevertheless, the House considers legal developments, constitutional dynamics, and public input arising from the judicial review of the Law a quo. These considerations will be considered by the House in improving the provisions of the Law a quo in the future,” Sarifudin stated during the hearing, which he attended virtually from the House building.

Also read:

Petitioners Question Removal of Legislative Oversight During Emergency

Petitioners Affirm Arguments Challenging Removal of Legislative Oversight During Emergency

Hearing on Legislative Oversight over Emergency Postponed

At the preliminary hearing on Wednesday, May 6 in one of the Court’s panel courtrooms, the Petitioners presented their challenge of the constitutionality of Article 1 paragraphs (1) and (2), Article 2 paragraph (1), Article 3 paragraph (2), Article 4 paragraph (1), Article 5 paragraph (1), Article 6 paragraph (1), Article 33, Article 37 paragraph (3), Article 41 Point 1, Article 43 paragraph (5), Article 54, General Elucidation Point 2, and the General Elucidation to Article 1 of the Law a quo, which they argue are inconsistent with the 1945 Constitution. The challenged provisions are alleged to contravene Article 7A, Article 11 paragraph (1), Article 18 paragraph (1), Article 20A paragraph (1), Article 24 paragraph (1), Article 24C paragraph (2), Article 27 paragraph (3), Article 28A, Article 28C paragraph (2), Article 28D paragraph (1), Article 28G paragraph (1), Article 28I paragraph (1), and Article 30 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution.

The Petitioners argued that following the third amendment to the 1945 Constitution, sovereignty vested in the people is no longer exercised by the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), but rather in accordance with the Constitution. In addition, the president is no longer elected by the MPR, but directly elected by the people through general elections.

The Petitioners acknowledged that the elimination of the House’s supervisory function during a state of emergency does not constitute a direct constitutional loss to them because they are not members of the House. However, they argued that the loss of such supervisory authority adversely affects them because they would be required to submit to all orders issued by the emergency authority. The Petitioners therefore expect the House, as the people’s representative elected through general elections, to be able to exercise its oversight function in order to protect them should the law ever actually be invoked.

The Petitioners further raised a fundamental question: if citizens seek to hold the president accountable for unlawful acts or abuses of power committed as an emergency authority, what mechanism of accountability would be available? According to the Petitioners, this question cannot simply be answered through impeachment. The constitutional provisions governing presidential impeachment under Article 7A of the 1945 Constitution can only be initiated upon a proposal from the House.

They then questioned how the House could propose impeachment when, from the outset, its supervisory function has already been restricted during a state of emergency. Moreover, the House would be unable to submit such a proposal because all alleged violations would have been committed under emergency conditions that prohibit oversight. Accordingly, the Petitioners argued that all provisions restricting the House’s supervisory function, as contained in General Elucidation Point 2 and the General Elucidation to Article 1 of the law a quo, are contrary to Article 7A of the 1945 Constitution.

In their petition, the Petitioners also described the practices in sixteen countries—including Ireland, France, South Africa, and Colombia—all of which continue to involve legislative institutions as representatives of the people in supervising executive power during states of emergency. According to the Petitioners, none of these countries eliminate the supervisory function of the legislature during emergencies in the way Indonesia does.

In fact, they argued, oversight mechanisms during emergencies are generally strengthened by involving legislative institutions at every stage, including pre-declaration, declaration, post-declaration, administration of emergency conditions, revocation of emergency status, and even requiring the President to submit accountability reports to the legislature for evaluation of whether all measures taken during the emergency were justified.

Based on these arguments, the Petitioners requested the Court to declare Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 23 of 1959 on the Revocation of Law No. 74 of 1957 and the Declaration of a State of Emergency contrary to the 1945 Constitution and therefore conditionally unconstitutional insofar as “no amendments are made within six months from the pronouncement of this decision.” They also asked the Court to order the House, as the lawmaking body, to make the necessary amendments within six months from the pronouncement of this decision, and if no amendments are made within that period, then Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 23 of 1959 on the Revocation of Law No. 74 of 1957 and the Declaration of a State of Emergency shall become permanently unconstitutional.

Explore Case No. 151/PUU-XXIV/2026 (in Indonesian).

Author         : Sri Pujianti
Editor          : N. Rosi
Translator    : Yuniar Widiastuti (NL)

Disclaimer: The original version of the news is in Indonesian. In case of any differences between the English and the Indonesian versions, the Indonesian version will prevail.

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