Lacking Object, Petitions on Presidential Tickets’ Age Limit Declared Inadmissible
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Chief Justice Anwar Usman and Deputy Chief Justice Saldi Isra at the ruling hearing on the age limit of presidential tickets, Monday (10/23/2023). Photo by MKRI/Ifa.


JAKARTA (MKRI) — Five petitions regarding the age limit of presidential tickets as stipulated in Article 169 letter q of Law No. 7 of 2017 on General Elections (Election Law) were declared inadmissible. The ruling hearing for cases No. 102/PUU-XXI/2023, 104/PUU-XXI/2023, 107/PUU-XXI/2023, 96/PUU-XXI/2023, and 93/PUU-XXI/2023 took place on Monday, October 23, 2023 in the plenary courtroom.

In the conclusions of the five cases, the Court considered the subject matters of the Petitioners on the judicial review of Article 169 letter q of the Election Law missing objects. “[The Court] declares the Petitioners’ petitions on the judicial review of Article 169 letter q of Law No. 7 of 2017 inadmissible,” said Chief Justice Anwar Usman, who read out the verdicts for the five decisions.

Also read:

Maximum Age Limit for Presidential Tickets in Election Law Questioned

Petitioner on Maximum Age Limit for Presidential Tickets Revises Legal Standing

The Petitioners of case No. 102/PUU-XXI/2023 argued that Article 169 letter q of the Election Law did not regulate the maximum age limit to become presidential and vice-presidential candidates so the Petitioners’ constitutional right to a productive, energetic, and physically and mentally healthy president would, at least based on logical reasoning, be inevitably and potentially lost if the president and vice president elected through general election were more than 70 years old.

In its legal consideration read out by Constitutional Justice Daniel Yusmic P. Foekh, the Court asserted that the object of the petition was Article 169 letter q of the Election Law, which was not different from that in case No. 90/PUU-XXI/2023, which the Court ruled in October 16 with the verdict, “[The Court] declares Article 169 letter q of Law No. 7 of 2017 on General Elections that reads ‘at least 40 (forty) years of age’ in violation of the 1945 Constitution and not legally binding if not interpreted as ‘at least 40 (forty) years of age or has occupied/is occupying an office elected through a general election, including the election of heads of regions,’ so that Article 169 letter q of the Election Law now reads, ‘at least 40 (forty) years of age or has been or is currently in an office elected through general election including regional head election.’”

Therefore, Justice Foekh continued, Article 169 letter q of the Election Law, which is the object of the a quo petition, has had a new meaning since the Constitutional Court Decision No. 90/PUU-XXI/2023 was pronounced and is no longer as stated in the a quo petition. “As such, whether the petition meets the provisions of Article 60 of the Constitutional Court Law and Article 78 of the Constitutional Court Regulation No. 2 of 2021 on judicial review procedure or not, the Petitioners’ arguments relating to Article 169 letter q of Law No.7 of 2017 have lost their object,” he said. These considerations also apply Constitutional Court Decision No. 104/PUU-XXI/2023, which was read out by Deputy Chief Justice Saldi Isra.

Expansion of Meaning

In case No. 102/PUU-XXI/2023, the Petitioner also requested the interpretation of Article 169 letter d of the Election Law, specifically on the phrase “having never committed any act of treason against the state and having never committed any acts of corruption or other serious crimes.” They asserted that the phrase did not regulate clearly and in detail other serious crimes in Indonesian legislation. They also alleged that the phrase had created ambiguity, thus causing legal uncertainty and was contrary to Article 7A, Article 28D paragraph (1), Article 28G paragraphs (1) and (2), and Article 281 paragraphs (1), paragraph (4), and (5) of the 1945 Constitution.

The Court held that the Petitioners’ arguments could not be separated from the essence of Article 169 letter d of Law No. 7 of 2017 as a whole, which prescribed the requirements of never having never committed treason, corruption, and other serious crimes. However, in the petitum, the Petitioners wished for Article 169 letter d to be expanded through the addition of the phrase “having no record of committing human rights violations, having not involved in and/or being part of abduction of activists in 1998, having not involved in and/or being an actor of forced disappearance, having never committed any crimes of genocide, having not involved in and/or being an actor of any crimes against humanity and anti-democratic acts.” Thus, apart from making the interpretation of Article 169 letter d redundant, it could create repetition, which could evoke doubt, and might narrow the scope of the basic norms that are naturally contained in Article 169 letter d of the Election Law.

“Because the phrase ‘serious crimes’ also includes the crimes the Petitioners wished to be included in the expansion of the meaning of Article 169 letter d of Law No. 7 of 2017 as petitioned, the Court holds that accommodating the Petitioners’ wish by expanding [it] could actually weaken the legal certainty that already exists and is inherent in the norm in question,” Justice Foekh explained.

The Court held that the arguments in the petition, especially regarding the desire to include or add types of serious crimes without providing confirmation whether the types intended are backed up with sufficient assumption, allegation, investigation, or even court decision that has permanent legal, could add to the complexity of applying the legal norm in question.

“In this case, it is important for the Court to emphasize that even if the Petitioners wished for the types of serious crimes to be included in Article 169 letter d of Law No. 7 of 2017, it should have a court decision that has permanent legal force. This is important because if the Petitioners’ request was granted, it would potentially violate the principle of presumption of innocence,” Justice Foekh said.

Reduce Restrictions

Meanwhile, related to case No. 104/PUU-XXI/2023, filed by Gulfino Guevarrato, the Court in the its considerations, delivered by Deputy Chief Justice Saldi Isra, emphasized that the meaning of Article 169 letter n of the Election Law is quite clear and firm. Thus, when the Petitioner requested that the Court give an additional meaning—which was completely new and not related to the original meaning—concerning limit to the frequency of nomination to a maximum of 2 (two) times, it would not only create a new meaning for Article 169 letter n, but also legal uncertainty.

In addition, in its legal considerations for previous decisions, the Court has taken a stance to eliminate or at least reduce restrictions for Indonesian citizens who want to become presidential tickets. The Petitioner’s request for additional conditions, the Court held, if granted, would limit or reduce the freedom of Indonesian citizens to run as presidential tickets.

“Based on such legal considerations, the Court holds that the Petitioner’s request that Article 169 letter n of Law No. 7 of 2017 be declared unconstitutional insofar as it is not interpreted as ‘having never served as a president or a vice president for two terms in the same position and having never run for president or vice president two times for the same position,’ legally unreasonable,” Justice Saldi said.

Dissenting Opinion

Constitutional Justice Suhartoyo delivered a dissenting opinion for both cases. The request that Article 169 letter q be interpreted as the Petitioners intended, he stated, was not for their own interests, thus, did not warrant legal standing as petitioners in the a quo petitions. He asserted that his dissenting opinions for cases No. No. 29/PUU-XXI/2023, No. 51/PUU-XXI/2023, No. 90/PUU-XXI/2023, and No. 102/PUU-XXI/2023 are, mutatis mutandis, an integral part of the legal considerations in his dissenting opinion for the a quo petitions.

“Based on the aforementioned legal considerations, I find that for the a quo petition as far as it relates to the examination of Article 169 letter n and letter q of Law No. 7 of 2017, the Constitutional Court should also not grant legal standing to the Petitioners and, thus, it was irrelevant to consider the subject matter of the petition as far as it relates to the constitutionality of Article 169 letter n and letter q of Law No. 7 of 2017,” he stated.

Also read:

Citizens Propose Age Limits for Presidential Tickets

Citizens Revise Petition on Age Limit for Presidential Tickets

Case No. 102/PUU-XXI/2023 was filed by Rio Saputro, et al., while case No. 104/PUU-XXI/2023 was filed by Gulfino Guevarrato. Meanwhile, the other three petitions were declared inadmissible: cases No. 107/PUU-XXI/2023 by Rudy Hartono, No. 96/PUU-XXI/2023 by Guy Rangga Boro, and No. 93/PUU-XXI/2023 by Riko Sinaga.

Author       : Utami Argawati
Editor        : Lulu Anjarsari P.
PR            : Raisa Ayuditha
Translator  : Tahlitha Laela/Yuniar Widiastuti (NL)

Disclaimer: The original version of the news is in Indonesian. In case of any differences between the English and the Indonesian versions, the Indonesian version will prevail.


Monday, October 23, 2023 | 15:21 WIB 211