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Ruling hearing of the judicial review of the Road Traffic and Land Transportation (LLAJ) Law, Thursday (25/6) in the Plenary Courtroom of the Constitutional Court. Photo by Humas MK/Gani.

JAKARTA, Public Relations of the Constitutional Court—The judicial review petition of Law No. 22 of 2009 on the Road Traffic and Land Transportation (LLAJ) filed by Marcell Kurniawan (Petitioner I) and Roslianna Ginting (Petitioner II) who work in driving training course was rejected by the Constitutional Court (MK). "The [Court] adjudicated, rejects the Petitioners’ petition in its entirety," said plenary chairman Chief Constitutional Justice Anwar Usman along with the other constitutional justices in the ruling pronouncement of Decision No. 14/PUU-XVIII/2020 on Thursday (25/6/2020).

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The Petitioners had argued that the phrase "or self-learning" in Article 77 of the LLAJ Law was in violation of Article 31 paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution because it challenges the uniformity regarding attitude, knowledge, and skills on driving, hence restricting the implementation of national education.

"With regard to the a quo argument, it needs to be emphasized that the national education system aims to develop students’ potentials [for them] to become people of faith and to fear God Almighty and be virtuous, healthy, knowledgeable, capable, creative, independent, and become citizens who are democratic and responsible, not only through certain ways. The education can be delivered through various ways: formal, non-formal, and informal. The three ways complement each other in order to achieve the objectives of the national education," said Constitutional Justice Enny Nurbaningsih, who read out the opinion of the Court.

The Petitioners also argued that the phrase "or self-learning" in Article 77 paragraph (3) of the LLAJ Law is contrary to Article 1 paragraph (3) and Article 28D paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution because it is unfair to the output of the Petitioners’ courses and training institutions. According to the Court, the objective of a driving course is to obtain driving competence, in this case a driver’s license (SIM). All provisions regarding the conditions, types, and institutions authorized to issue the SIMhas is regulated in Article 77, Article 80, Article 81, Article 84, Article 85, Article 86, Article 87, and Article 88 of the LLAJ Law.

Any prospective driver who does not pass the driving test referred to in the a quo law cannot obtain a driver’s license, even if they have take courses at educational and training institutions. If anyone who learns by themselves passes a driving test and is declared to have sufficient competence to obtain a SIM, that competency must be recognized and cannot deemed invalid.

In addition, according to the Court, in the national education system and in daily practice, anyone who learns by themselves can pass the standardization test just as those who obtain that skill through official education and training by trained professional staff. This does not imply uncertainty regarding the accreditation of the trainers and instructors concerned.

Therefore, the Court is of the opinion that it is not possible for the state to forbid its citizens to gain expertise through self-learning alone without enrolling in an accredited institution, because the measure of competence is an examination that has standards, not on how the competency was obtained.

Even in international standards, to some extent, for example, mastery of English as evidenced by a certificate of Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) or International English Language Testing System (IELTS) does not require a person to have attended education and training. This also does not imply legal uncertainty and injustice towards the accreditation of English teachers.

"Based on these considerations, the Petitioners’ argument that the phrase ‘or self-learning’ in Article 77 paragraph (3) of the LLAJ Law is contrary to Article 1 paragraph (3) and Article 28D paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution is groundless according to law," said Constitutional Justice Daniel Yusmic P. Foekh, who also read the opinion of the Court. (Nano Tresna Arfana/Halim/NRA)

Translated by: Yuniar Widiastuti

Translation uploaded on 6/26/2020

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