The Constitutional Court (MK) has finally decided to reject the entire petition on Testing Act (PUU) No.. 28/2009 on Regional Taxes and Levies (Act on PDRD) - No. 1/PUU-X/2012. Hence the decision Constitutional judges’ verdict in a trial that took place on Tuesday (8/1) afternoon at the Plenary Court Courtroom.

The provisions of article being tested by Budikwanto Kuesar et al regarding the heavy equipment and the associated heavy equipment and large equipment are in operation using the wheels and motors, and are not permanently attached to a motor vehicle, as the object of Motor Vehicle Tax (PKB) and Tax on Motor Vehicles (BBNKB). As an entrepreneur heavy equipment and large equipment they bear double taxation, because the petitioners have to pay value added tax (VAT) and Income Tax (PPB).

Article 23A of the 1945 Constitution which states, "Taxes and other fees that are forcing the country for the purposes stipulated by the Law." Based on the article according to the Court and to Section 18 UUD 1945, drafted laws that in principle PDRD a delegation of authority derived from Article 23A of the 1945 Constitution which regulates the imposition of PKB and BBN-KB, including in this case is heavy equipment and tools large. Thus PDRD Act cannot be contrasted with Article 23A of the 1945 Constitution, so that the Petitioners’ argument is groundless according to law.

Furthermore, the argument of Article 1 paragraph 13 of Law PDRD had violated the principle of correspondence between the type and substance of the legislation giving rise to legal uncertainty. Because the definition of "motor vehicle" contained in the Act as lex generalis PDRD not refer to the definition of "motor vehicle" contained in the Traffic Act as lex specialis. In this case, the law has expanded understanding PDRD vehicles include heavy equipment and large equipment, which the Traffic Act is not considered that. According to the Court, the Petitioners’ argument is groundless law. Court found "understanding motor vehicle" as stated in the Act PDRD a form reformulation that aims to provide limits to the local government about the objects which may be taxed or levies. In addition, it also aims to close loopholes and tax avoidance and evasion simplify tax administration, as well as other purposes.

Definition of motor vehicles in the Act on PDRD in principle is no different from the definition of motor vehicle in the Traffic Act. This can be seen in the provisions of Article 47 paragraph (2) Traffic Act which states, "motor vehicle under paragraph (1) letter a grouped by type: ... e. Special Vehicle ", and in the elucidation of Article 47 paragraph (2) letter e stated," which is a "special vehicle" means a motor vehicle specially designed with a specific function and design, among other things: ... c. heavy equipment such as bulldozers, tractors, roller (stoomwaltz), forklifts, loaders, excavators, and cranes ". Under these provisions, it is evident that the Traffic Act was put into the category of heavy equipment vehicles.

Similarly, the argument that states that the Act PDRD a lex generalis and Traffic Law is a lex specialist, according to the Court, the argument is not correct. In this case, the law is the PDRD just a lex specialist, because the law is the law governing the tax collection base and levies, which the applicant submitted to the Court to test its constitutionality, particularly in relation to the provision of the local tax collection tools heavy equipment and large equipment.

It is obvious that the Petitioners’ argument stating that should the definition of "motor vehicle" in the Act and refers to the subject PDRD definition of "motor vehicle" set forth in the Traffic Act is unfounded arguments. "Verdict, prosecuting, said the petitioner rejected entirely," said Plenary Chairman Mahfud MD. (Nano Tresna Arfana / mh)